Recently there has been a lot of activity with regards to
Kathmandu Terai/Madhesh Fast Track Road (KTMFT). DPR was awarded to IL&FS consortium in
March and now there is talk in the media for the same consortium to take on the
project on a BOT basis which part of the growing popularity of the PPP (public
private partnership) movement in the award of infrastructure projects. Any PPP is a sharing of risk and return
between the private and the public parties and this sharing should be based on
who is able to take on the risk properly and how the cost of those risks are borne
by the parties. The distribution of risk
and return should be balanced between the parties.
With what little information that is out in the public
domain, one gets the feeling that in the KTMFT case proper due diligence and
balancing of risk and return on the project between the parties have not been
done. There also appears to be a fundamental
flaw in the overall analysis upon which certain terms and conditions have been
defined for the project. I just want to
focus on two issues that seems to make this project very one-sided and to the
detriment of the Nepali taxpayers.
The LOI (http://www.mopit.gov.np/files/download/LOI%20Notice.pdf)
intent published in the MOPIT (Minsitry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport) web site mentions that it expects to award the
IL&FS consortium the project based on the numbers they have provided with
respect to the cumulative passenger carrying units (or vehicles) of 558,356,865
and the present value of the minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) of NPR 317,040,820,961.09 over the 25 year operations period.
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| Table 1: Minimum PCU and MRG as per LOI to award dated Feb 6, 2015 |
First let us dissect what the cumulative PCU implies. Essentially, GON will be guaranteeing that
the concessionaire will get 559,365,865 million vehicles using the road over
the 25 year concession period. This translates
into 22,334,275 (559,365,865 / 25) vehicles per year or 61,190 vehicles per day
(22,334,275 / 365) or 2,550 (61,190 / 24) per hour or 43 per minute (2,550/60)
over the entire operations period. Anybody
who has driven from Kathmandu to Mugling (the busiest section of Nepali
highways) knows that is nowhere the case and it will take decades to reach that
level. An article in Kantipur on 2014-03-11 states that a survey revised down the expected traffic on this road to 3,000
per day from the ADB estimate of 7,000 per day.
(http://www.ekantipur.com/2014/03/11/business/study-downgrades-expected-traffic-on-planned-fast-track/386571.html)
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| Table 2: MRG based on Minimum PCU and impact of 10% shortfall in Minimum PCU |
The minimum revenue guarantee is based on this figure. If you assume monthly payments over a 25 year period, to get the minimum revenue from the implied PCU, the toll fees have to average 1,550 per vehicle or 20 rupees per kilometer. (In Excel use the PV function with the rate set as 10%/12, Term as 25 x 12, PMT as 22,334,275/12 x 1,550. You will get a PV very close to the PV of given MRG.) In India for cars and jeeps, toll fees are usually less than 1 Indian Rupee per kilometer. There is even talk about exempting the fees to private cars and jeeps. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/highway-toll-may-be-exempt-for-private-vehicles-levies-kick-in/article1-1298953.aspx) The implied toll fees in the MRG will make this one of the most expensive toll fees in the world. Therefore the willingness to pay for the use of the toll road by non-commercial users may not be there. According to media reports, toll fees for KTMFT road is expected to be 800 rupees for two wheelers and 1,600 rupees for cars and jeeps. For a person earning 30,000 rupees per month a two-wheeler round-trip on the KTMFT will cost him 5.2% of his monthly salary
Add to this, the fact that an alternative route to the Terai,
the Kathmandu Hetauda Tunnel Road, has also been awarded to a different group of investors. If this gets off the ground and completed,
most of the container/commercial traffic from Birgunj making the trip to
Kathmandu will prefer this shorter route which means that the average implied
daily PCU will be even more difficult to achieve. Planners should also realize
that for traffic to and from the west and far west, both of these roads do not
necessarily lead to significant savings in fuel costs and only marginal savings in terms of time. Existing highways are being broadened which
means that the diversion of central and east bound traffic to these planned toll roads
will make them less congested.
West and far west bound traffic might find that the benefit of using
the toll roads are not as compelling for them.
It is therefore very certain at the outset that the Nepali
taxpayers will be paying IL&FS consortium compensation fees as a
result of this MRG. We will be entering this
agreement knowing very well that the MRG will start clicking from the very
first year and most likely will continue for the entire 25 years. A 10% missed target over the 25 years implies a pay out to the concessionaire of 31.7 billion rupees or approximately 317 million USD at todays current FX rates in present value terms. Clearly the risk and return associated with
this project has not been thought through properly.
It appears that the GON has a clause that assures that it
will get 80% of revenue for vehicle traffic above the PCU. But if the minimum PCU is itself unachievable
this benefit-sharing term is meaningless.
The second question I want to tackle is the value
transferred by the subsidized financing provided by the government. The government has two subsidized financing
schemes. A grant not exceeding 15
billion rupees. If this is part of the
equity and the government is going to share in the profits proportionately, I
may have very little to say about it.
But if this is a grant and the concessionaire does not have to pay it
back with the relevant return then this is 15 billion of value transferred to
the concessionaire from the Nepali taxpayers so obviously not in Nepal’s
interest.
The other subsidized financing is with regards to 75 billion
rupees in long term low interest loans at 3%. In
an article in Kantipur IL&FS consortium says that it could build the road with
a commercial loan at 13%. (http://www.ekantipur.com/2015/07/22/business/hopeful-fast-track-builder-asks-for-help-with-funding/408256.html)
Let us use this to determine the value GON is transferring to the
concessionaire on the 75 billion at these rates. Let us assume that payment will be made in
equal quarterly installments. So all you
have to do is determine the quarterly payment under the two different interest
rates and then calculate the present value of the different in payment.
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| Table 3: Estimate of value of interest rate savings given as per LOI. Payments are equal quarterly payments so Loan is paid off at the end of 25 years. |
Let us use the 10% that MOPIT mentions in its
various documents when calling for RFP for the project to calculate the present
value. How they came up with this number
is in itself a big question but we will not discuss that here. The difference in payments will be 1.47 billion per quarter whose PV will be 53.91 billion or 72% of the face value of
the loan. We have not taken into account the grossing up of interest payments
that are done during the construction period.
This is in essence the value that GON is transferring to the concessionaire
relative to the market. The question is
what is the GON or Nepali taxpayers getting in return?
The above analysis is based on the fact that
the loan will be in NPR. If the loan is
in USD, then 3% rate is just 0.14% over the 30 year USD treasury rate. Obviously this does not reflect the risk of
the project. Similarly, let us hope that
this is not a fixed rate loan because it is evidently clear that interest rates in
the US will be rising. Let us also hope that the government has not provided an FX rate guarantee. This has its own implications.
From what I have read in the media and the information that
is available on MOPIT’s website, I find that the anticipated award to IL&FS
consortium is very one sided primarily to the benefit of the concessionaire. The concessionaire is not even bringing
financing to the deal but instead is getting significant subsidized financing
and also ensured a minimum return that is not feasible at all from the anticipated vehicle flow
dynamics. I have no arguments with the
PPP model as long as proper due diligence has been done and we have taken
balanced approach to the distribution of risk and return between the parties
involved.
As is, this project is a disaster in the making and going to
be an embarrassment to the GON and the Nepalese taxpayers in the future. As a concerned Nepali citizen, I would like
the responsible authorities to undertake a proper analysis to ensure that the
award of this contract is done only after ensuring a proper risk return
analysis to all stake holders involved.
Finally
if the government is going to arrange all the financing then why not use the
Build, Operate and Maintain model where the concessionaire gets a fixed percentage of the
total construction cost as fee during the construction phase and a fixed
percentage of annual gross profit during the operation and maintenance phase.
Note: I have also read in some media reports that the operation period will be for 30 years and certain terms and conditions with regards to PCU and MRG have changed. It is therefore possible that certain issues I have mentioned in this blog may not reflect the current status of the project. Regardless, it is very important to take stock of how realistic the assumptions going into the analysis are since they will drive the risk and returns of the project which will be shared by the parties involved, in this case GON and the IL&FS consortium.
